

Modern Intra-Balochistan Conflict and its Different Interpretations: A Critical Analysis under CPEC Scenario

Muhammad Akram Zaheer

The Islamia University of Bahawalpur, Bahawalpur, Pakistan.

Muhammad Ikram

University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.

Muhammad Asim

Govt. Degree College Fateh Jang, Attock, Pakistan.

Sawaira Rashid

University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.

ABSTRACT

Rival states of Pakistan always propagate annexation of Balochistan into Pakistan as an illegal act since 1948 but they neglect historical facts which highlighted not only the friendly relations between Jinnah and Khan of Kalat but also press release of Viceroy's House New Delhi on August 11, 1947 about natural affiliation of Pakistan and State of Kalat. Similarly, Pak-China relations since the 1949 had unofficially recognized the need of "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) that was totally unacceptable for anti-Pakistan states. Therefore, they always tried to trigger ethnic identities regarding destabilizing Pakistan. And, 40% Baloch ethnic community of Balochistan Province is one of their targets. This study describes the geopolitical and economic importance of the province for Pakistan that encourage anti-Pakistan states to trigger intra-Balochistan conflict regarding destabilizing economically and politically. As their funded waves of insurgency have been minimized by the mutual cooperation of Pakistan Army and the local patriotic populace, this study also highlights triggered thoughts against CPEC routes that have to link Kashgar to Gwadar from three directions within the Balochistan. Military strategy about completion of CPEC project and the socio-economic development of Balochistan is analyzed according to the philosophies presented by David Keen and Paul Collier.

Key Words: OBOR, Clement Attlee, Dar-ul-Umara, KGB, RAW, KHAD

Ethical consideration

This study tries to present viewpoints of the authors under respecting the constitutional right about freedom of expression to all the social groups within the Pakistan by avoiding undue intrusion, obtaining informed consent, and protecting the rights to privacy of individuals and social groups which convey their opinions to the author during his personal visit of different cities in Balochistan along with Pak-Iran highway (in between Quetta and Taftan).

And, authors believe that there would not be any harmful activity against socio-cultural differences and conflicting problems within Pakistan.

Introduction

China's momentum to materialize its "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) strategy in South Asia stresses pragmatic study of the Beijing's visualization in the region, especially in Pakistan. Pakistan; the China's western neighbor was one of the three countries where China instigated its OBOR project, entitled with the "China-Pakistan Economic Corridor" (CPEC). In fact, it is a chain of different plans and projects that has to link the China with Central Asia, Middle East and the Europe. Unlike OBOR's other two routes (Kashgar-Dushanbe-Moscow and Kashgar-Kabul-Mashad), CPEC route will connect Xinjiang autonomous region of China to the Balochistan Province; the largest and most deprived province of Pakistan (Sharma, 2016, PP.01-02). Moreover, there are further three routes of CPEC within Pakistan that link Kashgar to Gwadar from three dimensions; called eastern, western and central routes of CPEC. Besides an half century with full of militancy and insurgency by the anti-Pakistan Baloch ethno-national separatists, modern intra-Balochistan conflict over preferring anyone among these three CPEC routes is imbibing peace and stability in the province since 2004 (Shafiqat, 2017).

Historically, intra-Balochistan conflict is not the new phenomenon on in Balochistan. There are three interpretations in this regard where first belongs to anti-Pakistan funded elements, second demands greater regional autonomy within the federation of Pakistan and third seeks strict central-authoritarianism over provincial affairs. Generally, Balochistan's struggle for autonomy dates back to the late 19th century when British Empire took control over the Balochistan. Similarly, it struggled during early 20th century regarding becoming a "British free" region. Later on, some anti-Pakistan Baloch nationalists claim that the region was forcibly seized by the newly established Pakistan in 1948 (John, 2009, PP.23-24). On the other hand, pro-Pakistani Baloch nationalists describe post-1947 version of this conflict as a struggle between central-authoritarianism and regional autonomy. They call the province as artificial hell between the federal and domestic elites (Zurutuza, 2015). According to them, geographical ups and downs of the Balochistan facilitates Pakistan Army to secure or hide its strategic assists. Therefore, it wants to keep away the local population as well as agents of rival intelligence agencies from the respective parts of the province. For this purpose, artificial violence and insurgency between fake central-authoritarian and regional-autonomist powers has been crafted that is successfully stopping "free movement" of the people in the province. Likewise, propaganda against such artificial conflict is basically a targeted campaign against the hidden strategic assists of Pakistan Army in the province (Zurutuza, 2015). However, actual intra-Balochistan conflict generated since the 2004 when Musharraf government officially planned to link Gwadar with Kashgar. Because of three proposed routes regarding linking Kashgar and Gwadar, pro-Pakistani Baloch nationalists, politicians and intellectuals went to

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promote their preferred route among these three where they felt their interests. This study at one end, comparatively discussed the rivalry between pro-Pakistan Baloch people and anti-Pakistan funded elements where pro-Pakistan segment has further been divided into two groups; advocates of greater regional autonomy and the supporters of strict central-authoritarianism while, the future strategy of Pakistan Army and Federal Government regarding economic development in the province under CPEC project is also analyzed at another end under the speculations of David Keen and Paul Collier which lead strong patriotism, national harmony, economic equivalency and socio-political parity in entire Pakistan.

History of armed conflicts and insurgency in Balochistan

Balochistan was consisted of four princely states before joining Pakistan. These were Kalat, Makran, Kharan and Lasbela. Among them, Kharan, Lasbela and Makran showed their open willingness to join Pakistan during the dissolution of the British Indian Empire in 1947 (Rodeni, 1997, P.80). However, anti-Pakistan Baloch nationalists claim that the State of Kalat under Ahmed Yaar Khan decided to get sovereign status according to the options given by the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee (1945-1951) to all the princely states at the time (Siddiqi, 2012, P.59). While, Pakistan installed its army there in April 1948 which was forced Khan of Kalat to accede the state to Pakistan. In reaction, his brother Prince Kareem Khan called for independence of the state and departed to Afghanistan regarding seeking aid for beginning an armed struggle against Pakistan but failed. This occupation led the annexation of entire Balochistan to Pakistan till the June 1948 (Akbar, 2011, P.292).

On the other hand, pro-Pakistani Baloch nationalists argue that the discussions between the Government of Pakistan and the State of Kalat were started in February 1948 (Baloch, 2017). Jinnah wrote a letter to the Khan of Kalat;

“I advise you to join Pakistan without further delay, and, let me have your final reply which you promised to do after your stay with me in Karachi when we fully discussed the whole question in all its aspects” (Baloch, 2017).

Similarly, Jinnah visited Sibi on February 15, 1948. Main reason for this visit of Jinnah was also to convince the Khan of Kalat regarding acceding to Pakistan (Saiyid, 2012). However, Khan of Kalat could not meet him because of illness. So, he wrote the letter to Jinnah that he had summoned both Houses of the Kalat’s Parliament; Dar-ul-Awam and Dar-ul-Umara for their decision about the future relations with the Dominion of Pakistan, and, he will inform him about the decision of Parliament by the end of this month (Saiyid, 2012).

On February 21, 1948, Kalat’s Dar-ul-Awam decided not to accede Pakistan but to initiate a treaty regarding determining future relations with Pakistan. This decision led Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pakistan to make a law regarding annexation of princely states with Pakistan on March 17, 1948. With following

this law, Khan of Kalat signed unconditional agreement about annexation of the state to Pakistan on March 27, 1948 (Akbar, 2011, P.292, Siddiqi, 2012, P.61).

Since then, history of armed conflicts and insurgency in Balochistan got two dimensions. One reflects anti-Pakistan attitude while, second describes pro-Pakistani viewpoint. On the other hand, US Ambassador to Pakistan at that time informed Secretary of State in his dispatch on March 23, 1948 that “Kharan, Makran and Lasbela (feudatory states of Kalat) had joined Pakistan” (Veena, 2015). This dispatch also supported pro-Pakistani viewpoint in this regard. According to Yaqoob Khan Bangash, Khan of Kalat coerced to join Pakistan on March 27, 1948 when his efforts to acquire sovereign Balochistan became failed. Unconditional annexation of Makran, Kharan and Lasbela to Pakistan left the Khan of Kalat alone in his ambitions (Bangash, 2011). So, he took decision against his own parliament and announced annexation of Kalat with Pakistan. However, some anti-Pakistan Baloch nationalists including his brother started agitation against the federation of Pakistan with foreign funding that is still failing by the efforts of pro-Pakistani populace, federal government and Pakistan Army (Bangash, 2011, Akbar, 2011, P.292).

As the military of every country seeks mountainous or desolated areas for preserving its military assets, Balochistan became the ideal location for Pakistan Army regarding this. Therefore, since then, not only Pakistan Army desired to remain the Balochistan desolated but also tried to control the movement of the local people for veiling its military reserves and transportation (Singh, 2010, PP.01-02). On the other hand, the prime motive behind armed conflicts or insurgency in the province is not the demand for regional autonomy or economic development actually. These conflicts are foreign funded that basic aim is to debilitate Pakistan Army and decimate its high-cost assets in the province. Therefore, Balochistan has become a slice between the pro-Pakistan and anti-Pakistan segments of the society where some social groups have also adopted anti-Pakistan attitude because of lacking awareness regarding strategic worth of the region for Pakistan. However, numerous plans under CPEC projects are facilitating Baloch population to examine actual foreign-aided rivals within their folds (Shaukat, 2016).

Since 1948, rival states of Pakistan like India and Afghanistan tried to laminate their anti-state activities in Balochistan with Baloch ethnic identity that resulted further four waves of violent agitation against federation of Pakistan since 1948. These were during 1958-1959, 1963-1969, 1973-1977 and continued since 2004 (Talukdar, 2016). The 1958-1959 agitation was initiated by Nawab Nauroz Khan (head of Zarakzai tribe in the State of Kalat). Because of his self-assumptions about undermining tribal status and state structure, he took up arms with his followers against the One Unit policy. This insurgency was bottled-up by Pakistan Army because of highly proved Indian and Afghan military intelligence support (Balochistan Tumult, 2012). Majority of militants were arrested and charged with treason. Five of Nauroz Khan’s family members were later hanged

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upon the charges of treason in Hyderabad Jail. Nawab Nauroz Khan was also died in imprisonment (Baloch, 2008, Bangash, 2011, Akbar, 2011, P.292).

To observe the worst failure of the ethnic-crusted militancy in the province, rival state encouraged Baloch nationalists in 1963 to stand against the federation of Pakistan on the self-crafted issue of inappropriate share of Balochistan in the revenue generated from the Sui Gas Fields (Said, 1994, P.436, Ahmad, 1992, P.176). Apparently, this insurgency was leading by the prominent Mengal, Marri and Bugti tribal leaders that demanding tribal-based share of Balochistan in the revenue but actually, it was another effort to destabilize federation of Pakistan and destruct its military power. Insurgents blasted ambushed convoys and railway tracks. A Marxist-oriented Sher Muhammad Marri (head of Marri tribe) led this insurgency with the open support of Afghanistan and Soviet Union. However, Pakistan Army reacted by destroying big portion of the Marri tribe's land that forced majority of militants to leave anti-state activities. But, their little segment continued agitation against the federation till the 1967 (Said, 1994, P.436, Ahmad, 1992, P.176). General amnesty awarded by the federation of Pakistan on humanitarian bases to the Baloch militants in 1967 regarding leaving foreign sponsored militant attitude facilitated this segment to throw their weapons. Several reports also claimed with referring intelligence reports of KGB, RAW and KHAD that the actual purpose of funding this wave was to cut off Pakistan's nuclear program at initial level somewhere at "secret place" in Balochistan (Harrison, 1981, P.72). On the other hand, federal elites revised their "One Unit" policy in 1970 and established entire Balochistan region as one province under the federation of Pakistan with merging four princely states, Chief Commissioner's Balochistan, territory of Gwadar, and, tribal Balochistan. Unlike elimination, this decision caused conversion of princely states or tribal based insurgency into province based insurgency. In fact, anti-Pakistan trends of rival states had also been changed after analyzing counter strategy of Pakistan. Thus, to secure their interests in the region, now they were propagating a sovereign Balochistan on the base of Baloch ethnic nationalism (Harrison, 1981, P.72, Said, 1994, P.436, Ahmad, 1992, P.176).

Now, Soviet Union including USSR-backed Iraq planned to destabilize Pakistan and Iran mutually by installing sentiments for "Greater Balochistan" in Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan. This plan became failed through the military raid on the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad in 1973 where huge volume of Soviet-smuggled weapons was searched out (Nunan, 2016, P.123, John, 2009, P.23). With citing treason, President Zulfqar Ali Bhutto dismissed provincial assemblies of Balochistan and Northwest frontier Province, and, imposed martial law in both provinces regarding investigating secret relations between political leaders of both provinces with Soviet Union and Iraq. However, some Baloch nationalists including Marxist-Leninist-oriented Khair Bakhsh Marri called this dismissal as violation of Balochistan's political rights, led guerrilla war against federation of

Pakistan that resulted 300 to 400 casualties of Pakistan Army while, 7,300 to 9,000 separatists were killed till the 1977 (Nunan, 2016, P.123, John, 2009, P.23). With the assistance of Imperial Iranian Army, this wave was not only crushed but also forced anti-Pakistan Baloch nationalists to either leave the country or accept federal structure. While, the general amnesty granted by the Lieutenant General Rahimuddin Khan in 1977 under the martial law also facilitated Baloch militants to give up foreign funded anti-state activities (Nunan, 2016, P.123, John, 2009, P.23). On the other hand, Waqar Ghallu states that “India and pro-Indian elements realized that Pakistan will fast its nuclear program after planned 1974 Pokhran-1 nuclear test. So, a destabilize Balochistan would help them to not only trace out the actual locations of nuclear laboratories but also find out secret military reservoirs in Balochistan. Therefore, they sponsored, promoted, funded and backed this insurgency” (Ghallu, 2016).

At the completely end of this wave, Pakistan designed a counter strategy to hide the Balochistan and its hot-watered deep sea from rival eyes. On backing Afghan Jihad, indirectly Pakistan designed a successful multifarious web against India, Afghanistan and Soviet Union nexus which kept them away from Balochistan but wiped out KHAD-RAW ties from Kabul against Pakistan till the 1996 (Ejaz, 2017). Post-Taliban Afghanistan once again encourages India and other rival states to station their agents around the Durand Line regarding detracting proposed Kashgar-Gwadar road link through NWFP and Balochistan. As the present form of CPEC project was firstly projected by the General Pervez Musharraf, Chinese engineers with the collaboration of National Highway Authority completed Khunjerab-Gilgit part of Karakoram Highway as metal road during his regime. However, strong foreign funded militancy in NWFP and Balochistan against this project coerced him to postpone further developments until the successful military operation against anti-Pakistan elements. In 2004, militants attacked Gwadar port that resulted death of three Chinese engineers and four wounded. In reaction, Pakistan Army initiated a large scale operation in Balochistan, NWFP and Tribal Areas against anti-state sponsored elements. In the meanwhile, Baloch political leaders; Nawab Akbar Bugti and Balach Marri offered a 15-points agenda to the federal government of Pakistan that ultimately aimed to demand greater regional autonomy to the province over its resources, and, removing military bases from the province (Shaukat, 2016). On the other hand, military intelligence reports were indicating huge foreign funding behind these demands. On December 15, 2005, the inspector general of the Frontier Corps; Major General Shujaat Zamir Dar including his deputy Brigadier Salim Nawaz were wounded after firing at their helicopter in the Balochistan. Chain of this attack was also proved with the 15-points agenda and Gwadar Port Attack 2004 that forced Pakistan Army to launch military operation against sponsored Baloch nationalists. Furthermore, an interview of Nawab Akbar Bugti to BBC regarding demanding military support from India for independence of Balochistan made the situation more intense (Akbar, 2017). On August 26, 2006, he was killed in a military operation along with 37 militants and 21 soldiers of Pakistan Army

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(Akbar, 2017). Anti-Pakistan elements tried to cash this operation as an attack on Baloch ethnic identity and motivated common Baloch people to start agitation against federation of Pakistan. However, Pakistan Army not only crush this insurgency but exposed hidden ambitions of India, Afghanistan and other rival states behind sponsoring Baloch ethnic identity based militancy. One of such ambitions was to curtail CPEC Project while, other one was to trace out secret military reservoirs in the province (Shafqat, 2017).

In 2008, Pervez Musharraf stepped down because of political instability (Shah, 2008). To see his step down, anti-Pakistan elements further triggered by the rival states. On August 12, 2009, Khan of Kalat Mir Suleman Dawood declared himself as the ruler of Greater Balochistan (Baloch, 2009). He also announced a so-called legislative council of Independent Greater Balochistan. This council claimed a domain that includes Pakistani Balochistan and Iranian Seestan-o-Baluchestan However, it did not include Afghan Baloch regions. From the platform of this council, Mir Suleman Dawood stated that the “UK had a moral responsibility to raise the issue of Balochistan’s illegal occupation at international level” (Baloch, 2009). However, this declaration could not gain any minor support at the grass root level in Pakistan or Iran. So, this funded claim flew in the air (Bhai, 2009).

On the other hand, the government of Pakistan People’s Party once again announced to restart Musharraf’s planned project on May 22, 2013. President Asif Ali Zardari and the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang agreed to construct an economic corridor between both countries (Fels, 2016, P.484). Both sides also determined to further boost mutual connectivity regarding long term planning under China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Moreover, three-dimensional role of President Asif Ali Zardari positively changed the ethnic and economic environment of Balochistan. At one side, he projected himself as belong to Sindhi language speaking Baloch tribe and a true well-wisher of Baloch ethnic community while, on the other side, he convinced Chinese leadership on the base of common democratic-socialist ideology that would contribute in future reading securing mutual regional political and economic interests of both nations. Similarly, his third dimension was not to stop military operation against anti-Pakistan Baloch nationalists even he inaugurated several welfare based projects for Balochistan like Aghaz Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package (Fels, 2016, PP.484-486).

His presidency caused not only an elimination of remaining little Baloch ethnic nationalism through democratic channel but also made closer China and Iran to Pakistan on an issue of regional security and common interests. Similarly, he had convinced Afghanistan to participate in the CPEC Project (Khan, 2016). However, regional politics changed during the succeeding government of Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). Although, sponsored militancy including funded Baloch ethnic nationalism in the Balochistan went down to a lowest level but Iranian and Afghan attitudes molded towards Indian hegemonic orientations. Indian funded

road from Kabul to Chabahar and Modi's speeches during his visit to Central Asian states regarding urging them to use Chabahar Port instead of shortest-routed Gwadar Port attracted Iranian economic interests that were going to be damaged in case of CPEC Project completion (Mukherjee, 2016). However, issue of arresting Indian spy Kalbhoshan Yadav and tracing out its Chabahar based anti-Pakistan campaign put pressure on Iranian government from Pakistan and China regarding either to declare its anti-Pakistan position or participate in CPEC Project (Siddiq, 2016). Thus, with realizing future demise of Chabahar Port in case of Gwadar Port functioning, Iran showed its intention to participate in CPEC Project. Because, it would be the only solution of somewhat business sustaining opportunity for Chabahar Port. For this purpose, Iran admitted the statement issued by Chief Minister of Balochistan; Sanaullah Zahri on January 12, 2016 that Chabahar and Gwadar are "Sister Port Cities" (Zafar, 2016).

On the other hand, Iran-Afghanistan-India nexus exhibited against CPEC Project and stability of Balochistan on May 23, 2016 when these countries signed "Three-Way Transit Accord" bypassing Pakistan. Instead of any regret on Kalbhoshan's March 3rd arrest, India and Iran including Afghanistan openly inclined towards demoralizing and discouraging Pakistani market in entire world (Riyad, 2016). With raising almost-dead sponsored issue of Baloch ethnic nationalism, these countries once again tries to propagate anti-Pakistan and anti-CPEC campaign. However, Iran and Afghanistan forgot the claim from the little bit foreign-funded a foreign-settled advocates of Greater Balochistan that includes several Iranian and Afghan Baloch regions also. Moreover, this accord died from the day first because of longest trade route for Central Asian states rather than the CPEC Project (Riyad, 2016).

At the same time, on an issue of missing persons and militant activities of Pakistan-based banned organizations like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi against Hazara community, pro-Pakistan segment of the Balochistan believe that majority of missing persons were involved in anti-state activities or under connectivity of foreign-funded Baloch nationalists (Butt, 2013, HRW, 2014). However, machination about attacks on Hazara community has two dimensional views. One dimension believes that Hazara community is Iranian-favored because of sectarian harmony. Therefore, several intelligence reports identified Iranian spies in between Hazara community that were trying to trace out secret military strategic positions during their movement from Iran to Pakistan or Pakistan to Iran. Therefore, Pakistan Army not only targeted such anti-Pakistan elements but also restricted their pilgrimage-based movement under strict military observation. While, the second dimension considers that Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is ISI-backed militant group that basic aim is to promote fear against free movement of common people including rival states' agents in Balochistan Province just to hide secret military assets. Therefore, Balochistan has nothing but manufactured as an artificial hell that is burning for artificially crafted issues (Butt, 2013, HRW, 2014).

Moreover, on an issue of regional autonomy, 18th amendment stopped the voices of regional autonomy in Balochistan. Although, some triggered elements in

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the provinces sometimes criticized their self-assumed contradiction between strictly federation-owned CPEC project and the provincial autonomy under 18th amendment but such allegations have been rejected by majority of Baloch, Brahui and Pashtun populace of Balochistan because several projects under CPEC would have to facilitate local population directly (Bukhari, 2016, Rafiq, 2017).

CPEC related projects in Balochistan

On October 05, 2016, Chinese ambassador to Pakistan Zhao Lijian explained at least 16 CPEC related projects in Balochistan. These include Khuzdar-Basima Highway (N-30), D.I.Khan-Quetta Highway (N-50), Gwadar Eastbay Expressway I, Gwadar Eastbay Expressway II, Gwadar New International Airport, Gwadar Smart Port City, Hubco Coal Power Plant, 300MW Gwadar Power Plant, Master Plan, and, Expansion of Multi-purpose Terminal including Gwadar-Nawabshah LNG Terminal and Pipeline, Gwadar Free Zone, Fresh Water Supply for Gwadar City, Treatment Plants for Gwadar City, Gwadar Hospital Upgradation, Breakwater & Dredging Wastewater in Gwadar, Gwadar Primary School, and, Gwadar Technical & Vocational College (Lijian, 2016).

Similarly, a proposed wide railway network would encourage socio-economic developments in entire Balochistan. To link Gwadar with Kashgar, there are three proposed railway tracks.

- 1) First railway line will be constructed from Gwadar to Karachi via Pasni, Ormara and Liara (Rafiq, 2017).
- 2) Second railway line will connected Gwadar to Jacobabad and Spezand via Basima (Rafiq, 2017).
- 3) While, the third railway line will Bostan to Darya Khan via Muslim Bagh, Zhob and Dera Ismail Khan (Rafiq, 2017).

Furthermore, these railway lines will be linked further to Kunjerab Railway (Taxila Junction to Khunjerab) via mainstream railway lines in Pakistan. Moreover, it will be associated with the Lanzhou-Xinjiang Railway of China for linking Urmuqi, Kashgar, Lanzhou and Gansu (Ahmad, 2014).

These projects and proposed railway stations would not only affected domestic economic activities in the major cities of Balochistan but it would become a cause of modernization in the parochialism. It would further alter the ancient patterns of tribal, oldest-mountainous or culturally conservative life style according to global patterns that can associate common Baloch people to the relatively developed population of Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Similarly, each proposed railway station or road interchange would encourage local and international investors to install their business around such places that link them to domestic as well as international market (Bukhari, 2016).

Issue of preferring eastern, western or central route of CPEC

After undermining anti-Pakistan funded Baloch ethno-national separatism and voices for regional autonomy, modern phase of intra-Balochistan conflict is now experiencing another triggered issue of preferring eastern, western or central route of CPEC. Different segments of Baloch politicians and nationalists are describing their concerns over construction of eastern, western or central route firstly. According to them, western route of CPEC must be constructed firstly because of predicting poverty alleviation from backward regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan while, they also blame on federal elites (belong to Punjab and Sindh) that they are highly preferring eastern route of this project that would only facilitate already developed Punjab and Sindh. However, Chinese ambassador to Pakistan Zhao Lijian fully briefed chief ministers of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan on October 05, 2016 and satisfied them on preferred working over western route. Since then, such voices have also been minimized but a little bit elements are still triggering against such satisfaction (Lijian, 2016, Bukhari, 2016, Rafiq, 2017).

Question about military strategies behind CPEC

As the Army Chief General Qamar Bajwa has expressed that the CPEC Project will help in tackling intra-Balochistan conflict as well as counter efforts regarding derailing peace in Balochistan. In a gathering at Khuzdar Engineering University on January 05, 2017, he said;

“I am confident that the current security challenges and external efforts to derail peace will end with the growing realization of geo-economic advantages of a fully developed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project and infrastructure projects all over Balochistan” (Bajwa, 2017).

Now, the question arises in the minds of common patriotic Pakistani that how socio-economic developments in Balochistan under CPEC would remain hide secret military assets and weapons’ reservoirs from local citizens as well as foreigners. Its answer can be easily traced by analyzing common traits between the philosophies of David Keen and Paul Collier. As both scholars are recognized as the experts of analyzing ethnic nationalism on the bases of political economy, implication of their philosophies upon military strategies behind CPEC explains in five points. These are as follows;

- 1) Rival states always try to trigger separate ethnic identity of the region against state-centric structure (Keen, 2008, PP.11-15, Collier, 2011, PP.03-34).
- 2) Common people of that region get inspirations only when they are economically deprived (Keen, 2008, PP.11-15, Collier, 2011, PP.03-34).
- 3) Unlike economic interests of rival states in triggering region, existing state has also lot of economic and geopolitical significance of that

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specific region that can boost its national growth against rival states (Keen, 2008, PP.11-15, Collier, 2011, PP.03-34).

- 4) Private war industries play their games at both ends; to encourage artificial ethno-national separatism through their agents regarding sailing their attacking weapons, and, to motivate state-centric nationalism regarding sailing their defensive weapons to the state army (Keen, 2008, PP.11-15, Collier, 2011, PP.03-34).
- 5) Only the equality and wide-ranged progress based economic projects can coerce the local population of that region to stay peacefully in accommodating state. Such projects not only strengthen state-centric patriotism but also facilitate ethnic communities to associate with each other in politically peaceful and economically friendly environment without giving any minor space to anti-state sentiments or rival states' sponsored propaganda (Keen, 2008, PP.11-15, Collier, 2011, PP.03-34).

Thus, the statement of Army Chief General Qamar Bajwa is basically based upon the fifth point that identifying the losing space of rival states and private war industries in the Balochistan. Similarly, rise in economic standard of life would encourage local Baloch population to support army and security agencies regarding protecting their lives and assets from any sponsored or triggered insurgency. Peace and prosperity would become an ultimate target to achieve for each Pakistani including Baloch people. However, it does not mean that Pakistan Army would neglect its defensive traits. Conversion of traditional roads construction into carpeted roads in entire Balochistan is basically a plan of wide-ranging runways for Pakistan Air force (Shahid, 2016). Similarly, utilization of existing Quetta-Taftan railway line for freight trains instead of passenger trains is actually to hide the military equipments' transportation from local population around the roads (Shah, 2015). Moreover, 13 airports in major cities of Balochistan are also indicating strong defensive strategy of Pakistan Army. At the same time, military's restrict observation over Pak-Iran and Pak-Afghan public movements highlights the long term commitment of Pakistan Army regarding securing its secret military assets and reservoirs hidden in the desolated areas of Balochistan (Butt, 2016, Shahid, 2016). Various projects under CPEC are not just for economic growth and prosperity of the people but it would also enhance defensive capabilities of the Pakistan that would further never tolerate any sponsored ethno-national separatism or rival states' funded insurgency in the province. In case of any such disturbance, Pakistan, China and other biggest participants of CPEC would be at same ground against rivals.

Conclusion

Besides criticism of Baloch nationalists like Sardar Akhtar Jaan Mengal upon CPEC Projects, former Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz discussed that predicted national economic growth from CPEC Projects would produce stability in the

security situation of Pakistan (Mengal, 2017, Aziz, 2016). Same prediction has also been quoted by World Bank as hindrance to sustained economic growth in Pakistan (World Bank Overview, 2016). On the other hand, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that “the corridor will serve as a driver for connectivity between South Asia and East Asia” (Tiezzi, 2014). Likewise, Mushahid Hussain (politician and the chairman of Pakistan-China Institute) explained during his interview to “China Daily” that “the economic corridor will play a crucial role in regional integration of the Greater South Asia which further includes Afghanistan, Iran, China and stretches all the way to Myanmar” (Tiezzi, 2014). According to The Guardian, “The Chinese are not just offering to build much-needed infrastructure but also make Pakistan a key partner in its grand economic and strategic ambitions” (Boone, 2015).

To analyze such predicted economic estimates under once again foreseen threat of sponsored or locally emerged intra-Balochistan conflict, several scholars and patriotic elements in Pakistan urge the federal government to design more provinces on administrative bases including restoring the status of Gwadar as federal administrative territory. According to Khalid Chandio and Dr. Niaz Murtaza, Balochistan should be divided into two provinces on the base of Baloch and Pashtun identities while Gwadar should be controlled under federal government (like Indian union states territories) (Chandio, 2015, Murtaza, 2014). On the other hand, Gallup Pakistan Survey indicated that 42% Pakistanis demand new provinces on administrative bases as compared to just 15% Pakistanis who favor linguistic base provinces (Rafay, 2012). Hence, it is summarized that new administrative base provinces in entire Pakistan including Balochistan province will not only empower domestic population of different regions without any sense of socio-political or economic deprivation but it will also undermine any sponsored or foreign-funded ethno-national separatism against unity of the nation. And, economic prosperity and the socio-political development of Balochistan region is only concealed in the respective paradigm.

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Biographical Note

Muhammad Akram Zaheer is Ph.D. Scholar at Department of Political Science, The Islamia University of Bahawalpur, Pakistan.

Muhammad Ikram is Ph.D. Scholar at Centre for South Asian Studies, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.

Muhammad Asim is an Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science, Govt. Degree College Fateh Jang, Attock, Pakistan.

Sawaira Rashid is Ph.D. Scholar at Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.
