Dr. Khushboo Ejaz

Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, Kinnaird College for Women, Lahore, Pakistan.

Email: khushboo.ejaz@kinnaird.edu.pk

Noor Abid

Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, Kinnaird College for Women, Lahore, Pakistan.

ABSTRACT

Pakistan shares a border with India to its east and Afghanistan to its northwest. Due to Pakistan's geography it has suffered a lot in the aftermath of the 9/11 horrific incident. At the same time, India has become Afghanistan's largest donor, carrying out numerous socioeconomic and developmental projects mainly centered in Southern Afghanistan along with military training. India is increasing its influence in Afghanistan in terms of soft power. As a consequence, the growing relationship between India and Afghanistan poses a challenge to Pakistan's internal security. India is following Chanakya's philosophy and taking a variety of other steps to destabilize Pakistan and control Afghanistan because of its geographical position. India's prime motive is to strategically encircle Pakistan and become the regional hegemon. Hence, there is a geostrategic tussle going on between Pakistan and India in Afghanistan. Case Study design has been employed in this research. Structured interviews from subject specialist are carried out for this research. This research highlights what measures Pakistan should take in order to counter the Indo-Afghan nexus.

Key Words: India, Afghanistan, Pakistan & (9/11).

Introduction

Afghanistan is situated in the middle of energy deprived South Asia and rich of energy resources Central Asia as a landlocked state. It shares border with rising powers China and Russia through Central Asia. That is why the strategic importance of Afghanistan always attracts extra regional and regional powers to strengthen their influence in this region. Considering this into account, India and Pakistan have always had their own particular vested interests in the region (Kiran, 2009). The relationship of Afghanistan with the subcontinent dates back to the friendship of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

Pakistan's and India's race for who should have cordial relations with Afghanistan first began with the arrival of Hamid Karzai tenure and it prolonged. Both states, after emerging from the breakup of British Empire in South Asia following August 1947 had links with various Afghan governments.

Given Pakistan's geographical adjacency to Afghanistan, the two states never had cordial relations with each other due to Afghanistan's claim over the Durand Line. However, India and Afghanistan were able to maintain cordial relations during the rule of King Zahir Shah. Even after the overthrow of Zahir's regime, India was able to maintain close ties with succeeding governments. However, India was never in the favor of Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, typically how it was believed.

Nonetheless, Pakistan struggled to participate in a response to USSR's occupation. It received US economic and military aid of about \$3.2 billion for 6 long years. India, on the other hand resisted censorship of USSR's invasion. Rather, it has continued to work with consecutive governments of USSR. This was majorly because India never paid heed to the Islamic ideology of most of the Afghan mujahedeen who were sponsored on behalf of United States by Pakistan. Contrarily, India was reluctant to let down its military superiority to Pakistan. Thus, it was dependent on Soviets to provide advanced and unique weapon at relatively lower prices. India supported Massoud's forces during Soviet-Afghan war because of its hostility to Pakistan backed mujahidin groups.

In addition to this, ever since the demise of the British empire in India, the deep rooted dispute of Pakistan and Afghanistan over the validity of Durand Line intensified tensions between the two countries. The demarcation has been made illegitimate by ethnic Pashtuns and Baloch belts, straddling the Durand in front of many tribal areas. India immediately picked up the issue to exploit it (Hussian, 2011).

At last, the victory of Taliban in Afghanistan brought the accomplishment of Pakistan's military their desired goal from the beginning, that is, what they understood as a Pakistani influenced government that could provide them strategic depth against India. It was during that time when India seized its embassy in Afghanistan and called off its diplomatic staff back.

It was during this time when Pakistan took advantage of this hostility between Afghanistan and India, kept close ties with Taliban regime till the 9/11 tragedy happened. India also happened to secretly fund US led attempt to overthrow Taliban regime. India managed to secure a place during the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2004 (Howenstein & Ganguly, 2010). This was very advantageous that at Bonn the United States had decided to put Hamid Karzai and his followers in their lot.

As a result, India had plenty to be satisfied with its success as both a compromise nominee and a US-sponsored nominee for Afghanistan's president. Consequently, this would be absurd to suppose that India's very substantial role in Afghanistan derives from the country's willingness to maintain peace and stability. Additionally, Indian objectives in Afghanistan are twofold. Pakistan on the other hand has taken up a lead in evacuating terrorism from its soil and supports Afghan peace process. It plays a critical role in this process, fostering partnerships between Afghanistan's government and Taliban leadership.

Literature review

Price (2013) focuses on India's interest in Afghanistan by assuming that India has multifold ambitions and interests beginning from military relations to educational in Afghanistan all of which is centered upon establishing a stable Afghanistan in order to achieve its own objectives while keeping cordial relations simultaneously. Jawed (2016) highlights Indian involvement in Afghanistan is seen as antinationalist and Pakistan's position is seen as suspicious by nature. Though India also wants to play a key role in Afghanistan as a soft power, it wants to continue to help and support socio-economic developments.

Grare (2006) discusses that the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan have never been easy. Afghanistan was the sole country that voted against Pakistan's acceptance in United Nations soon after independence. Despite being the only state that delivered great assistance to Afghanistan during the war against Soviet forces, was voted against Pakistan's accession to the United Nations after independence by Afghanistan. In order to negate this situation, Pakistan assisted the insurgency in Afghanistan and the late Taliban in an effort to establish friendly government in Kabul but the attempt failed.

Hussian (2011) asserts that since 2001, the relationship between Pakistan's military agencies and the Afghan Taliban insurgency and both militant organizations have been a significant cause of tension and confrontation between the two nations. Many U.S officials have confirmed time to time about ISI's involvement in supporting terrorist as U.S secretary of defense Robert Gates said in 2009 in his CBS 60 minute interview that ISI maintains ties with groups such as the Afghan Taliban as a geopolitical shield to help Islamabad gain influence in Kabul once US forces leave the area..

Kiran (2009) elucidates how Pakistan and India are fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan since the demise of Taliban regime. However, Afghanistan seems to be facilitating India in this proxy war and making India accomplish its expansionist desires with which it will connect to Central Asia through Afghanistan.

Akram (2016) highlighted the significance of Chabahar port, by viewing it as a new great game in the regional geopolitics. As per his views, a new great game is currently underway between China and the United States with Pakistan, India, Iran and others in subsidiary roles. The main motivation behind the establishment of China's twin projects OBOR and CPEC are multiple; Indians and Americans are considered to be rivals to these Chinese mega projects.

Research objectives

- To examine the factors affecting Indo-Afghan nexus in post 9/11 period
- To highlight the commonality of interest of Pakistan and India in Afghanistan

- To inspect Indo-Afghan strategic alliance in post/11 era
- To analyze the implications of Indo-Afghan nexus on Pakistan's peace and security

Research methodology

The research is based on qualitative study. For this matter exploratory and descriptive, methodologies were used. Case study design has been used to carry out this research. Secondary sources such as research article in journals, research reports and books have been utilized to interpret the analysis on Indo-Afghan strategic alliance and what implications it poses for Pakistan. For primary sources, the data was collected through interviews of renowned professors of Lahore, Afghanistan and Indian academicians. Secondary source of data were used such as books, journals, research reports and internet. Total number of 4 respondents took part in the research through interviews. The first interview was taken from Dr. Marium Kamal; she is currently an Assistant Professor in Centre for South Asian Studies at Punjab University. She has done Ph.D in International Relations from PU. The second interview was taken from doctoral candidate Nabi Sahak who belongs to Afghanistan but resides in UK. He is a FulBright Scholar at King's College London in Department of War Studies. The third interview was taken from Dr. Tehmina Aslam Ranjha who is an Assistant Professor of Terrorism and National Security Department at University of Lahore. The fourth interview was taken from Dr. S. Krishnan who is an Assistant Professor of Seedling School of Law and Governance at Jaipur National University, India. A total number of 9 questions were asked that deduced the views of the respondents regarding Indo-Afghan alliance, what type of interests Pakistan and India have in Afghanistan, what are the factors affecting Indo-Afghan nexus in post 9/11 period, the Indian motive behind the establishment of Chabahar port, if there was an Indian role in fueling insurgency in Baluchistan, the security implication of Farkhor Air base along with policy recommendation for Pakistan to counter the Indo-Afghan nexus. Interviews were recorded through audio. Each interview was given approximately one hour. Interviews were later transcribed.

Major findings and analysis

1. India's strategic alliance with Afghanistan

After the tragic incident of 9/11, Afghanistan was caught in massive chaos and instability caused by an invasion by the US-led NATO forces. According to Brown (2015) it can never be assumed that NATO forces alone were the key actor in Afghanistan. But there were many other countries that were trying to get a hold of it too such as China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Russia. Indian assistance is primarily committed to developing human capacity, building infrastructure, enhancing security, and supporting agriculture along with other key sectors of the

economy. India, through its peaceful methods has embraced amicable methods of entry to Afghanistan. India has never wanted to break off its relations with Afghanistan in the aftermath of War on Terror. India has separate objectives for entry into Afghanistan.

The Indian involvement is solely driven by geo-strategic constraints, national security and energy security. However when it was asked from the respondents about what factors effect Indo-Afghan nexus in post 9/11 period, there was different views from Pakistani respondents. 1 out of 2 Pakistani believed that there was no such nexus that can be identified between India and Afghanistan as both of the countries share historical ties dating back 2000 years ago. While the other Pakistani respondent stressed upon Indian interest in Afghanistan in post/11 period that affects the nexus. As India is providing Afghanistan with aid on development, with being the largest regional donor, it wants to strategically encircle Pakistan. Consequently, it wants to pave the route for Central Asia alongside influencing its hegemonic characteristic over less developed states.

However, Afghani respondent believes that the only factor that affects Indo-Afghan nexus is security dilemma, the need for common place of defense brings India and Afghanistan close. If there remains no such factor then there will not exist any nexus.

Furthermore, Indian respondent believes that the factors affecting Indo-Afghan nexus are based on bringing democracy and stabilizing Afghanistan considering its geography and the Pakistan factor after the incident of 9/11. Moreover, India does not share a border with Afghanistan which ultimately puts India into a dependency role. For this reason, the Chabahar Port will enable smooth flow of trade between the two countries. Also, India never took part in military activities in Afghanistan; this gives India even more edge for developing good relations.

India's goals in Afghanistan obtain from a carefully orchestrated assessment of their domestic, regional, and global interests. According to Indian respondent, countering Pakistan's dominance is definitely one of India's priorities, but Delhi pursues a wide spectrum of interests in Afghanistan that goes beyond simply obstructing its biggest opponent.

2. Indian influence in terms of soft power

India, being a mature state, has used soft power as a weapon for foreign policy in Afghanistan. After the demise of Taliban regime, India has involved itself on more fronts with Afghanistan than Pakistan. However, Price (2013) explained that it happened partially because India previously had close ties with Karzai Northern Alliance leaders. India's humanitarian assistance along with huge amount of aid on development has changed public perception about India's utter barbarism in Afghanistan. Soft power is the product of the popularity of a country's policies, its political ideals and its culture.

Local media alongside international media has voiced a positive image of India. It has paid due respect to India's involvement in Afghanistan. On the contrary, media houses in Pakistan have portrayed Indian presence in Afghanistan as negative. Assuming India's support to a spiteful Afghanistan as a waste of efforts, Pakistan sees Afghanistan as a great threat to its internal national security.

On the other hand the respondents had various views regarding Indian soft diplomacy in Afghanistan, Pakistani respondents believed that India is trying to build a soft image by working on social programs mainly educations, and helping to build infrastructure. Indian interests are based on strategic encirclement of Pakistan through Afghanistan and to exploit the issue of Durand Line to make relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan hostile.

Afghani respondent on the other hand interpreted that India has made it clear on the surface level that it has historical and cultural ties with Afghanistan. But that is not only the case, India sees Afghanistan as a new emerging and promising market that is why it is helping Afghanistan to stand on its ground in order to let India achieve its own objectives.

Indian respondent was of the view that India has multiple interests in Afghanistan. The first one is to economically and politically develop Afghanistan in order to advance its own national security objective. An unstable Afghanistan will ultimately affect India. Likewise, India wants to gain access to Central Asian markets and energy sources through Afghanistan. The last interest is to minimize Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan.

3. Development programs

Major development programs, with indirect or direct consequences for Pakistan, being carried out by India are as follows:

- 1. The biggest project India has invested in is the development of road network. A road connecting from Derlam city, Herat Province on Kandahar-Herat Highway to Zaranj town bordering Afghanistan-Iran.
- 2. Construction of Salma Dam on the River Hari Rud in Chisht-e-Sharif. This project is known as Hydel Scheme.
- 3. Infrastructure Project in Northern Afghanistan; building of substations and transmission lines by carrying electricity from Uzbekistan to Kabul and intermediary cities.
- 4. Developing of a 4000 meters high 220 KV line across the Salang Pass.
- 5. Kandahar, in Southern Afghanistan is a huge fruit production hub. It produces approximately 35,000 tons of pomegranates. For this purpose, India has built a cold storage facility in Kandahar and became the largest importer.
- 6. Parliament building of Afghanistan established in December 2015 was made by India as a symbol of their friendship.

- 7. Student exchange programs and scholarship invitation to Afghanis; India opens up scholarships for nearly 500 undergraduates and post graduates under ICCR.
- 8. The Indo-Afghan friendship under Modi has further strengthened, by conducting various high level bilateral meeting. Modi also invited the then Prime Minister Hamid Karzai in 2014 in his swearing in ceremony.
- 9. India and Afghanistan have developed air linkages with one another.

4. Assistance by RAW

Pakistan was a front-line force for combating the Soviet aggression during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Kiran (2009) reported that India supported the Soviets through RAW at the time and gave full support to KGB and Afghan spy agency Khad against Pakistan through assassination and terrorist activities. The origins of the revolts were rooted in Baluchistan where the flames are now being fanned by the Indian intelligence service RAW. Sarobi is another command Centre run by an Indian Officer, who is also in charge of the Border Road Organization (BRO). Pakistani dissidents are educated for missions in the NWFP at Sarobi. Kandahar itself has frontline branches in Nawah and Lashkargah. Baluchistan rebels are trained to conduct missions in Baluchistan and to support the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) at Lashkarga.

Nearly 600 Balochi tribal activists were trained at these centers to handle bombs, plan bomb explosions and use heavy weapons. Officials from Afghanistan have time and again assured how India continues to use Afghanistan to create trouble and chaos in Pakistan.

However, when the respondents were asked if India had any hand in fueling insurgency in Baluchistan, Pakistani respondents agreed to Indian involvement in Baluchistan and to counter this insurgency Pakistan has to address the grievances of Baluchi's and a sense of unity should be built in the people simultaneously. Pakistan should also focus on enhancing security at its Iran-Pakistan border. Additionally, Afghani respondent sees held no opinion about the Indian insurgency in Baluchistan. He was of the view that in a classic realist theory we are always suspicious of our neighbors.

On the other hand, Indian respondent clearly rejected this notion of Indian involvement in Baluchistan. He was of the opinion that Baluchistan's own shura is used as Afghan Taliban's launch pad. And Pakistan keeps on blaming Afghanistan and India for it while India has no interest in Baluchistan since it is not a disputed territory between Pakistan and India.

5. Development of Chabahar Port

India represents one of the world's fastest growing economies. It is by nature, inclined towards expanding its trade ties with other states and creates access to new emerging markets. Central Asia is a growing market. According to Solangi

and Hassan (2019) India is in fact searching for new routes to enter Central Asian Markets because of its adverse relationship with Pakistan. Although, Pakistan's promising Gwadar Port is one possible route for India to enter Central Asian markets. Afghanistan also aims to extend its trade networks to enter international markets. Afghanistan also seeks to reduce its reliance on Pakistan, from which most trade in Afghanistan goes. India, Afghanistan, and Iran signed Chabahar Port Agreement as part of the North-South Transport Corridor in 2003, making it possible for the three countries to utilize Chabahar Port as a gateway for trade. Chabahar Port is situated in the Sistan and Baluchistan province on the Gulf of Oman, in southern Iran. Gwadar Port in Pakistan lies along the coast about 70 kilometers west. By sea, Afghanistan is linked to the port through its border region with Iran and India. The port is thus easily open to all three countries, which helps to facilitate trade cooperation between them. Chabahar is seen as an important weapon for India and Afghanistan to bypass the Pakistani Gwadar Seaport and its trading routes.

In December 2017, the Chabahar Port's first phase was inaugurated. India pledges to spend \$500 million under the first step deal. Afghanistan, being a landlocked territory, has relied more on trade routes for exporting its goods to Pakistan.

In 2009, India constructed a \$136 million road from Chabahar to Afghanistan, part of the ring road that links southern Afghanistan's Herat and Kandahar provinces to Kabul and then north to Mazar-e-Sharif, and finally the complete route links Afghanistan with Uzbekistan. Pant and Mehta (2018) elaborated on the Indian shipments, the first Indian shipment-700,000 tons of wheat - to Afghanistan arrived in Chabahar in November 2017. Solangi (2019) said that the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani inaugurated the first Afghan cargo ship bound for the port—570 tons of goods — in February 2019. The second shipment—80 tons of Afghan dry fruit — was shipped to India through the port in June 2019. The current export value of Afghanistan's exports is approximately \$1 billion, with Afghan officials confident that the figure may rise to \$2 billion in the coming year with Chabahar. In addition to the benefits of Afghanistan, Chabahar port gives benefits to India as well. China and India have long competed with South and Central Asia for economic prospects and capital. China has already invested in strong strategic and economic relations with Pakistan and both countries are working to strengthen their military and commercial cooperation through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port, all of which are part of the China Belt and Road Initiative.

At the very same time, India has also sought to find new strategic partners through which it can expand its trade activity in the region. Therefore, the port of Chabahar is in line with India's strategic objectives. It is an important cornerstone of the Indian foreign policy aimed at developing shorter routes for its exports and imports, countering China's influence in the Indian Ocean and circumventing Pakistan's Gwadar Port.

Some Pakistani analysts assert that Chabahar, in the context of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's foreign policy, is a step toward isolating Pakistan at regional level. Most importantly, some view the agreement as an Indian response to CPEC, as reflected in the Indian media. Ultimately, Islamabad's suspicions about Chabahar are apparently due to the Indian factor and the possibility of losing transit customers in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

When the respondents were asked about Indian motives for establishment of Chabahar port, each one of the respondent suspected that the motives revolve around strategic encirclement of Pakistan by India since India cannot carry out trade with Afghanistan directly due to Pakistan banning transfer of good from India to Afghanistan. Furthermore, all the respondents assume that Chabahar Port will counter Chinese influence in the Arabian Sea.

6. Farkhor Air Base

Tajikistan shares borders with China and Pakistan, among others — alongside Afghanistan's Wakhan Corridor, a small strip of land that share a frontier with PoK and China. Tajikistan is approximately 20 km from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir across the corridor.

The Farkhor airbase is approximately situated 80 miles south of the capital of Tajik Dushanbe. The airbase, strategically located adjacent to the Tajik-Afghan border, is critical for Tajikistan, particularly given the growing threat that the Taliban and al-Qaeda posed in the wake of 9/11. In 2002, the Taliban were less than 50 miles away from Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, which caused a great deal of alarm. Soon after, several agreements were signed between India and Tajikistan on a number of issues, coupled with a series of high-level visits, creating closer ties between the two countries. The benefits of the airbase were many for India. Kona (2007) sees these benefits as in Indian strategic depth vis-àvis Afghanistan and a convenient point of departure for transporting men or materials to and from Afghanistan. If one sees the Indian moves critically, it is growing its military presence in the Central Asian Region to totally isolate Pakistan.

Pakistan is worried about Indian military deployments in either Tajikistanor A fghanistan. These deployments would certainly put India behind Pakistani lines, with the risk of opening up a second front. When the respondents were asked about the Farkhor Airbase and its implication on regional security all the respondents assured that the airbase will never impact regional security. Since India wants to become a hegemonic power so it is advancing its relations, technological advancement and power while it can. Also, India and Tajikistan have cordial relations with each other. In this way, the presence of the airbase makes more sense

Implications for Pakistan

India's involvement in Afghanistan presents a continuing danger to the national security and territorial integrity of Pakistan. Alongside, it extends socio-economic implications for Pakistan as well in many ways:-

✤ Security implications

India's growing presence in Afghanistan is evident from the fact that India has paved its way into Afghanistan through soft diplomacy. With this, Afghanistan, acting as a buffer state through the course of its history needed an alliance and a state which it could rely on in terms of security concerns. As the Afghani respondent already suspects that if the security concerns are removed from the territory of Afghanistan, there will be no such alliance left between India and Afghanistan. However, since Afghanistan is on its path of political stability, it highly needs good relations with South Asian states and Central Asian states altogether. India on the other hand has its fair share in bringing stability to Afghanistan for the strategic encirclement of Pakistan according to Mustafa and Raza (2019). For this reason India, had been causing trouble and cross-border terrorism from Eastern border as well as using Afghanistan from the Northwest border. This claim is evident from the very famous Kulbhushan Jadhav case, who was arrested from Baluchistan on 3rd March, 2016 on the allegations of espionage and terrorism. He, during his investigation confessed that he had direct involvement in Baluchistan and RAW had played its role in sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan. Thus, this proves that India is continually trying to weaken Pakistan internally in order to achieve its strategic depth goals. In addition to this India is trying to convince the Afghan National Army (ANA) to begin border confrontations with Pakistan from time to time and consistently persuading the Afghanistan government and its masses to put up the issue of Durand Line. In this manner, Pakistan is being encircled through Eastern and Western sides. Moreover, Indian intelligence services are undertaking numerous operations at the Pak-Afghan frontier.

* Socio-economic implications

After 9/11, Pakistan had severed its ties with Afghanistan, while India, taking the advantage, strengthened its relations with Afghanistan. In the current time frame, India has stand out itself as for becoming the largest regional donor to Afghanistan. In addition to this, India is providing it in the form of aid on development. While India has its own reasons for bringing stability to Afghanistan and consequently built infrastructure, conducting student exchange programs and giving military training; all of which revolves around inducing anti-Pakistan sentiments among the Afghan masses. Moreover, the Parliament building of Afghanistan is also a gift by India, which symbolizes their strong relation. There

are major infrastructural projects being carried out in almost every province of Afghanistan as Masood (2013) has highlighted. According to Pakistani respondent, there have been multiple consulates established specially on the southern part of Afghanistan near Pak-Afghan border. This shows that India has deepened its roots in Afghanistan and maneuvers its policies due to all the investment and aid by India. Afghanistan being the least developed country is being manipulated by India and Afghanistan has to make policies that benefits India. India wants to isolate Pakistan through Chabahar port. Some view the establishment of Chabahar as an Indian response to CPEC. While Afghanistan is a landlocked nation, it is at the center of Central and South Asia's most significant trading routes. Ultimately, granting it greater importance in boosting regional connectivity.

Almost all of the respondents suspected that the prime motive behind the establishment of the Chabahar port revolves around strategic encirclement of Pakistan by India. Since India cannot carry out trade with Afghanistan directly due to Pakistan banning transfer of good from India to Afghanistan. However, all of the respondents believed that Chabahar Port will counter Chinese influence in the Arabian Sea. Thus, this will directly impact the economy of Pakistan.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is situated in the intersection of the Central, Middle and South Asian countries, one of the most important geographical positions in the world. The strategic location and rich mineral resources have always appealed to the international community including its neighbor Pakistan and India as well. Therefore, India's goals to establish ties with Afghanistan are numerous and decades old. After the tragic incident of 9/11, India maintained a good deal of involvement in Afghanistan, primarily based on soft diplomacy, giving aid on development. Likewise, it took measures to establish a stable Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistan turned its back towards Afghanistan following the incident of 9/11. Since then, India has taken every opportunity to foster its relations with Afghanistan in order to strategically encircle Pakistan. Moreover, the establishment of the Chabahar Port which will directly connect India to Afghanistan is another new great game to strategically encircle Pakistan. The growing alliance of Indo-Afghan and Pakistan's hostile relations with Afghanistan bring about a number of implications for Pakistan's peace and security. Research demonstrates that Indo-Afghan nexus is primarily based on India's desire to become a regional hegemon. For this matter, India is trying to maintain good relations with Central Asian states while accessing them through Afghanistan. At the same time, India is trying to induce anti-Pakistan sentiments into Afghan people through their soft diplomatic tools and building consulates near Southern Afghanistan and exploiting the issue of Durand Line from time to time.

Recommendations

- 1. Pakistan should built soft diplomacy with its neighbor Afghanistan. It should engage in cultural and student exchange program in order to build a good image among Afghanis about Pakistanis.
- 2. Pakistan must focus on removing all the barriers that come in the way of completion of Gwadar port. Gwadar port being functional will mitigate many of the current problems that Pakistan is facing.
- 3. Pakistan should take advantage of Chinese influence in Afghanistan to keep Indian presence distant.
- 4. Pakistan should establish good ties with Central Asian states such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

Appendix

Table 1 Projects in Different Provinces of Afghanistan by Indian Assistance

Province	Project with Indian assistances
Baghlan	 Construction of 220 KV (Pul-e-khumri – Kabul) transmission line Opening of English language and IT training centers for local population (Mansoor, 2013)
Balakh	 Indian medical mission in Mazar-e-Sharif's civil hospital Annually more than 22,000 local patients are treated and provided free of cost medicines Repair and construction of Imam Hazrat Ali's shrine with an amount of \$20,000 Opening of English language training centers for local population (Mansoor, 2013)
Faryab	 Provision of material and heavy equipment to install 125 km (Andhkhoi-Mairnana) transmission comprising 3 substations. Provision of telecommunication network with installation of more than 5000 SDMS-WLL lines. Installation of 100 Watt TV transmitter. Running of artificial limb centre for the victims of war (Mansoor, 2013)

Herat	 Construction of Salma Dam Project to generate of 42 MW of power form its units of 14 MW each (Mansoor, 2013) Provision of TV satellite downlink facility Induction of 30 buses in the local transport system Digging of 24 deep tube wells to uplift chronic irrigation system Indian medical mission to province of Heart. Annually more than 19,000 local patients are treated and provided free of cost medicines. Opening of IT training center for local population in University of Herat.
Jowzjan	 Indian medical mission to province of Jowzjan at Shibergan. Annually more than 24,000 local patients are treated and provided free of cost medicines.
Kabul	 Provision of 2 air buses to National airline of Afghanistan including relevant spare parts and equipment. Training for the crew of Ariana Airlines. Provision of 205 buses to give new life to the local transport system Provision of 300 road vehicles to Afghan armed forces. Provision of 105 utility buses to local municipality. Construction of Afghan Parliament building with an amount of \$25 million. Allocation of an amount of \$ 6.9 for the construction of 6 story hospital including its equipment and books for library. Indian medical mission to Kabul. Annually more than 100,000 local patients are treated and provided free of cost medicines. Repair and renovation of Habibia School of Kabul, provision of 8646 stationery kits for the students of same school. Provision of 15,345 sets of classroom furniture for different schools of Kabul. Setting up IT training center for Kabul which was further handed over to Afghan government (Mansoor, 2013) Provision of internet facilities and relevant IT equipment to ministry of foreign affairs. Provision of training to banking staff through Indian experts in

	this sector.
	 Opening of English Language training centers for the staff of different Afghan ministries Training to the staff of Communication department through Indian experts in this sector.
	 Provision of music instruments to Kabul University, local radio station, Kabul TV and Presidential guards. Installation of 100 Watt TV transmitter. Provision of TV satellite downlink facility Provision of high quality printing machine to Azadi press Provision of equipment and technical support for Industrial park of Pul-e-Charkhi Functioning of Artificial center to treat and help victims of Wars and amputees. Provision of measuring instrument and lab equipment for the engineers of ministry of Housing and Urban Development. Technical assistance for Quargha reservoir project. Technical assistance for the rehabilitation of Quargha and Amir Ghazi Dam including financial assistance of \$ 4.1 million (Mansoor, 2013)
Kandahar	 Indian medical mission to Kandahar. Annually more than 37,000 local patients are treated and provided free of cost medicines. Provision of TV satellite downlink facility Induction of 35 buses in the local transport system 2 phased Construction of different cold storages with an overall capacity of 14000 tons. Opening of IT training center for local population. Opening of English language teaching centre at Kandahar University (Mansoor, 2013)
Kunduz	 Technical assistance Khan bad irrigation project rehabilitation Provision of TV satellite downlink facility Induction of 6 buses in the local transport system
Nangarhar	 Indian Medical mission to Jalalabad Provision school furniture for 1501 students Construction of TV studio building

	• English language and IT training centre at Nangarhar University (Mansoor, 2013)
Nimruz	 Construction of 218 km long Zaranj-Delaram road. Provision of telecommunication network with installation of more than 3000 SDMS-WLL lines. Installation of 100 Watt TV transmitter. Provision of TV satellite downlink facility Induction of 2 buses in the local transport system Provision of school lab equipment and sports goods for schools of the province (Mansoor, 2013)

Source: Compiled by Researcher

References

- Akram, M. (2016). *The New Great Game*. Islamabad: Dawn. Retrieved from https://www.dawn.com/news/1264242
- Brown, V. F. (2015). *Pakistan's Relations With Afghanistan and Implications For Regional Politics*. The Brookings Institution, International Affairs.
- Daniels, R. (2013). Strategic Competition in South Asia: Gwadar, Chabahar, and the Risks of Infrastructure Development. *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 35(2), 93-100.
- Dutta, U., Ali, S. R., & Ahmad, N. (2019, May). Relevance and Values of Gandhi's and Bacha Khan's Moral Education in Negotiating/Addressing Situated Disparaties in South Asia. *Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute*, 9(2), 108-124.
- Gall, C. (2014). *The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Boston.
- Grare, F. (2006, October). Pakistan-Afghanistan Relation in the Post-9/11 Era. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, South Asia Project*.
- Hanauer, L., & Chalk, P. (2012). *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan*. California: RAND Corporation.
- Hassan, T. (2009). *Afghanistan Complex Situation and Its Implication on Pakistan* . Malmo, Sweden: Malmo University Electronic Publishing.
- Howenstein, N., & Ganguly, S. (2010, March). India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan. *Journal of International Affairs*.
- Hussian, Z. (2011, December). Source of Tension between Afghanistan & Pakistan: A Regional Perspective. Norwegian Peace Building Research Center.

- Kiran, A. (2009). Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan. *ISSRA Papers*, *1*, 1-18.
- Kona, S. (2007). *India in Central Asia: The Farkhor Airbase in Tajikistan*. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
- Pant, H. V., & Mehta, K. (2018). India in Chabahar: A Regional Imperative. *Asian Survey*, *58*(4), 660-678.
- Rafique, Z., & Anwar, M. A. (2014). Insurgency in Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan's Internal and External Security. *Defense and Security Analysis*, 30(3), 266-282.
- Raiphea, Y. P. (2013, April). India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership: An Analysis of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan Perspectives. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 3(4), 1-4.
- Rashid, A. (2009, April). Decent into Chaos: The U.S. and Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. *New York Times*.
- Solangi, R., & Hassan, A. (2019, March). Development of Chabahar Port: Challenges and Implications for Pakistan and CPEC. Social Science Research Network Electronic Journal, 1(1), 48-57.